The Beijing Consensus: policy responsibilities for artificial intelligence in education

Current consideration of the Beijing Consensus is informed by the international Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Education, May 2019, with consequences for governance, evidence and the treatment of affected learners. This matter should be read as a question of public administration and learner protection, not as a statement that one institutional model is suitable in every jurisdiction.

Status and scope

For Beijing Consensus, the Beijing Consensus on Artificial Intelligence and Education was adopted in May 2019. It addresses policy planning, management, teaching, learning, skills, lifelong learning, inclusion, gender equality, data and research. It promotes human-centred and equitable use rather than technology adoption as an end in itself. Authorities and providers should therefore connect each proposed use to an educational purpose, governance responsibility and evidence of benefit and risk.

For decisions concerning Beijing Consensus, technology may support teaching, administration and access, but consequential educational decisions must remain accountable, explainable and open to effective review.

• Notify users of material limitations.
• Classify uses by effect on learners before it informs a consequential decision.
• Review incidents and supplier changes.
• Test performance across relevant groups.
• Retain accountable human decision-makers.

Public-interest implications

The position at publication is informed by the international Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Education, May 2019; evidence from the affected setting remains necessary before reaching a conclusion on the Beijing Consensus. Decision-makers should state which matters are evidenced, which express policy and which require authorised judgement. Later review should not obscure whether the earlier position rested on fact, policy or judgement.

Ownership requires authority to act, access to the necessary evidence and resources, and accountability for the result. When examining Beijing Consensus, naming a coordinator without these conditions may obscure rather than clarify responsibility. The decision record for Beijing Consensus should distinguish the scope supported by evidence from any scope that remains unresolved.

Institutional responsibilities

Implementation of the Beijing Consensus should be organised around a decision that can be tested. Within the scope under review, a credible response should identify the applicable jurisdiction, the affected learners and providers, the authority responsible for implementation, and the evidence by which performance will be judged. Resources and activity should be reconciled with the operating evidence and result for which the responsible function is accountable.

Failure in relation to the policy position may arise even where the stated policy is reasonable. Material concerns include loss of meaningful human review, unclear responsibility between providers and suppliers, unequal performance across learner groups, and opaque use of personal or inferred data. For Beijing Consensus, materiality depends on the consequence and extent of an exception, not only on how often it appears in sampled records.

• How is progress evidenced?
• Does that person have authority and resources?
• Who verifies completion?
• Which decisions require escalation?
• Who is accountable for the outcome?

Continuing review

Assurance of the Beijing Consensus should draw on more than one form of evidence. Useful records include supplier change and incident records, documented authority for each consequential use, learner information and accessible challenge routes, data provenance and access controls, and pre-deployment and periodic performance testing. Policy and records should be tested against actual practice, including evidence from learners where appropriate.

Implementation of the arrangements can be tested without imposing unnecessary reporting. The method for the measure is to assign one accountable owner for the outcome, identify supporting roles, set decision and escalation points, and require periodic evidence of progress. When examining Beijing Consensus, transfer of ownership should be explicit and should not interrupt the action record. Reuse of existing information is appropriate only where its purpose, scope and reliability correspond to the decision under review.

Continuing review

Oversight of the Beijing Consensus should be based on an implementation map linking the public objective to domestic measures, provider controls and learner remedies.

Interpretation of the issue should avoid two errors: treating a formal commitment as proof of effect, and treating one adverse case as proof that every part of the system has failed. In this case, a technical capability is not evidence that a use is educationally justified. In work concerning Beijing Consensus, accuracy measured in one setting may not transfer to another population, language, curriculum or decision context. The existence of an international commitment does not remove the need for jurisdiction-specific interpretation, consultation and proportionate transition arrangements.

The assurance record for implementation should retain the date of the evidence, the source responsible for it, the scope examined and the version of any instrument or definition applied. Within the scope under review, traceable source and version information allow genuine improvement to be distinguished from administrative revision. For Beijing Consensus, revision should not remove an earlier conclusion from the record where reliance has occurred.

Accountability for Beijing Consensus should follow decision-making authority. Relevant evidence should reach the body authorised to commit resources, amend policy or accept residual risk, and its judgement should be recorded. Where work is delegated, the record should continue to identify who is accountable for material consequences to learners.

Assessment of implementation should reconcile more than one source of evidence and control. A conclusion concerning Beijing Consensus should be revised when stronger evidence materially changes the assessment of implementation, outcome or risk.